Report: Afghanistan: Humanitarianism Under Threat
by Suraj Sazawal, 4/13/2009
As the Obama administration heightens military and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, a new briefing paper links the success of national reconstruction to maintaining a demonstrable separation between humanitarian groups and the military. Presenting information collected over several years, Afghanistan: Humanitarianism Under Threat, written by Antonio Donini of the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, calls for swift action to prevent the misperceptions of local populations that result in violence toward aid workers and volunteers who are working for their benefit.
Updating a 2006 case study, the report reveals a striking deterioration of "assistance and protection" for civilians and aid groups in Afghanistan. The author conducted nearly 60 interviews with citizens, aid workers in the region and Afghani government officials to obtain a sweeping range of viewpoints of the volatile situation. The conclusion is a stark warning that the precarious humanitarian effort in Afghanistan is "under attack" and NGOs need to develop an independent strategy, including establishing their own certification program and finding new office space outside of government owned buildings, that will improve aid delivery and reduce violence toward relief workers.
Despite "tightened security procedures", NGOs experienced a 20 percent increase in security incidents in 2008 compared to 2007. In 2008, 31 aid workers were killed, 78 were abducted and 27 were seriously wounded in 170 security incidents, according to figures from the Afghanistan NGOs Safety Office.
Violence and shortages of basic necessities are commonplace in many parts of the country. There is a high demand for services, aid and investment. According to the report, the majority of aid is received from the same countries that also have military objectives in Afghanistan. This dual presence has blurred the distinction between who might be a threat and who is a neutral provider of aid.
In the aftermath of the most recent invasion, the report found that the aid agencies viewed their activities in Afghanistan as "post-conflict" and established relationships with government agencies. Operating "both as government-implementing partners, while, at the same time, trying to maintain a modicum of principle in addressing humanitarian need," humanitarian groups misunderstood the situation and have paid a steep price with their safety. "Because aid agencies are seen as adjuncts to the US-led coalition intervention and because of their perceived support of an ineffective and corrupt government," the misunderstanding of the environment by NGOs has resulted in "serious consequences."
The "comprehensive" approaches for military operations, assistance and development used by the government are pressuring NGOs to collaborate and that is driving the rise in violence. While not explicitly mentioned in the report, proposed rules such as USAID's proposed Partner Vetting System would also cause aid worker violence to swell. The report finds that NGOs are restricted by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)- government and civilian actors working to support reconstruction efforts in unstable states- and these arrangements only strengthen perceptions that NGOs are a piece of the military strategy in Afghanistan. The report finds the PRTs "troubling". If aid workers are to prove effective, they must try and regain some sense of neutrality, the report says. "Neutrality is not an end in itself; it is a means to fulfill the humanitarian imperative," the report states.
From the 1980s until the fall of the Taliban regime, attacks against relief workers and volunteers were rare, the report says. The consensus for explaining the recent considerable spike in violence is the "perception that NGOs are functionally linked to the political-military agenda of Coalition forces." This premise will be further tested as the U.S. increases the numbers of soldiers and contractors in Afghanistan in the spring of 2009. Many of the respondents to the authors' surveys shared a common prediction that "attacks against aid workers were likely to escalate in 2009 because of both the expansion of the Taliban areas of influence and the announced surge in U.S. troops."
Additionally, the appreciation expressed immediately after the initial invasion and toppling of the Taliban has since ceded to widespread anger and frustration as there is seemingly no departure date scheduled foreign soldiers. The rise in civilian casualties has become a "source of increasing acrimony" for the Afghanis who often hold any accessible foreigner responsible for the violence in their communities and respond in kind. NGO workers are not immune to these attacks and are easier to attack than military personnel. "There was a taboo against harming aid workers. This taboo no longer holds, in Afghanistan as in Iraq, largely because the aid enterprise is seen as tainted by its association with external political/military agendas," says the report.
The surge in violence has led directly to an evacuation of NGOs across the country. Even the United Nations has had a "shrinking area of operations". "In Afghanistan, the social contract of acceptability between humanitarian agencies, affected communities, and belligerents is rapidly breaking down," the report says. Large sections remain off limits for humanitarian groups because of security concerns. "Access and operational space are almost nonexistent in the south, south-east, and parts of the west of the country," according to the report. The dearth of security across much of the country has limited NGOs and "it is now impossible even to have a clear picture of the humanitarian situation on the ground," it adds.
The report concludes by citing "two key areas where urgent attention is needed." The first is to rebuild a humanitarian consensus in Afghanistan. The report believes that the "insulation and separation of humanitarian action from political agendas" starts with NGOs focusing on providing aid and distancing itself from government sponsorship as much as possible. An "approach based on greater independence of action" is necessary for to achieve success in rebuilding the war-torn nation. This includes:
- Creation of a certification process for NGOs by a consortium of respected NGOs
- NGOs need to develop a more "recognizable profile" to minimize confusion about their identity
- Subscribe to and promote a set of humanitarian principles (The report's author recommends something similar to the Humanitarian Operational Requirements negotiated between the U.N. and Taliban in 2000 or the Basic Operational Guidelines (BOG) that have been used in Nepal and Sri Lanka.)
- Create a monitoring mechanism to ensure the compliance of BOGs
- Physically relocate NGO offices away from government sponsored buildings.
The report's second recommendation is develop a comprehensive coherent humanitarian strategy. NGO leaders, donors to NGOs and civilians should participate during formation of the strategy. This includes:
- Mechanisms that promote donations are used in a "more multilateral and needs-based approach."
- A centralized humanitarian information and analysis facility; NGOs could use the data to better assess the areas of need
- Creation of an emergency task force that includes the Red Cross and U.N. to provide guidance to the entire humanitarian effort
