In today's issue of Roll Call, Norm Ornstein — a political pundit and scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute — articulates a rather damning assessment of recess appointment power (reprinted on the AEI website). Ornstein points out the danger of precedent in forming executive power. He then calls for Congress to stand up against President Bush's most recent batch of recess appointments including that of Susan Dudley. Every time a president abuses a power like this one, stretching the circumstances under which he will use recess appointments, it becomes a precedent for his successors, who will use his actions as a base point to stretch the power even further. The more the power is used with impunity, the more the core principles of the separation of powers are eroded. So what is a Congress to do? The only answer is to use its own powers to make clear to the president that there is a cost, and a serious one, to such behavior. Specifically, Ornstein suggests hitting the White House and these illegitimate appointees where it hurts: in the wallet. Congress could easily withhold the salary and other perks from embattled former nominee Sam Fox, and otherwise "make White House operations more difficult without cutting essential services." Ornstein also suggests this whole recess appointment mishigas is unconstitutional. In addition to the explicit language of Article 2 Section 2 Clause 3, Orstein cites America's original political genius, Alexander Hamilton. In Federalist paper No. 67, Hamilton articulates the caution with which America should consider the power of the recess appointment. Federalist No. 67 addresses Executive Power. In it, Hamilton examines presidential nominations and recess appointments. The following excerpt occurs in reference to Article 2 Section 2 Clause 3: The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, cannot be understood to comprehend the power of filling vacancies in the Senate, for the following reasons: -- First. The relation in which that clause stands to the other, which declares the general mode of appointing officers of the United States, denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to the other, for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to which the general method was inadequate. The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and Senate jointly, and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; but as it would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers and as vacancies might happen in their recess, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the President, singly, to make temporary appointments "during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session." Thanks to The Constitution Society for making the Federalist papers available.