An October 2007 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) addresses lingering weaknesses in the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) watchlist. GAO's report provides insight into what further actions can be taken by government agencies to enhance the accuracy of anti-terrorism screening efforts. The GAO report was released just as the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on the reliability of the Terrorist Screening System. During the hearing, Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) commented on the "critical vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the watch list system" saying, "We have a new system in place. It is a great improvement over what existed before. But there are still occasions when that system lets in people who are on the watchlist and keeps out people who shouldn't be on the list." He said, "We need to know that there are clear standards for placing names on it, and of course, for taking them off it." GAO's report and the testimony of GAO's Eileen Larence, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, helped provide clear insight into how names get on the watchlist. According to Larence, there is a relatively low bar set for watchlist nomination because intelligence agencies do not want to overlook potential threats. The GAO report states that the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) collects its information on domestic and international terrorists from several executive branch departments and agencies, such as the CIA, Department of State, and the FBI. She said the NCTC uses available information and standards of reasonableness to ascertain if suspected individuals have links to terrorist activity. If the FBI's threat assessment determines that no nexus exists between the suspected individual and international terrorism, then the NCTC initiates the process for deleting the record from its database and watchlist. While all of these improvements may enhance counter-terrorism efforts, the GAO report contends that an up-to-date strategy and a prioritized investment and implementation plan will result in the best use of terrorist related screening. GAO found that the Department of Homeland Security has not updated its strategy or plan for terrorist-related screening activities since 2004. Without such a plan, the federal government cannot fully support a comprehensive and coordinated approach toward terrorist-related screening. A comprehensive strategy or plan, with measurable goals, would make assessments much easier. In addition, GAO officials found that to date, no governance structure with clear lines of responsibility and authority monitors government-wide screening activities. Such monitoring efforts might include assessing vulnerabilities in screening processes, identifying new screening opportunities, and common corrective actions. Until oversight is provided, it seems that many concerns about the TSC watchlist may continue. However, because all watchlist records are not shared with all screening agencies, the actual effectiveness of the TSC watchlist is compromised. GAO's report reveals that principal agencies that frequently deal with travelers do not have access to all watchlist records, due to computer capabilities, varying organizational missions or mere operational feasibility. GAO concluded that federal departments and agencies have not identified all appropriate opportunities for conducting terrorist-related screening. For instance, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 allows private sector employees to be screened against the TSC list, but these screening opportunities remain primarily untapped. Such practices result in the types of errors mentioned by Lieberman. According to the GAO report, the TSC and other federal agencies are currently taking steps to address practices that have occasionally allowed watchlist persons to pass through screening processes undetected. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol recently created an interdisciplinary working group to ascertain how individuals on the watchlist have gained entry into the U.S. In a similar manner, in April 2007, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services entered into a memorandum of understanding with TSC, which if implemented could allow more efficient and through searches of watchlist records during the screening of benefit applicants. Also, the TSC has formed and chairs an interagency working group that helps share best practices amongst various agencies. The GAO report also reveals that the TSC has ongoing quality assurance efforts to identify and correct incomplete or inaccurate records.