As Congress's work crafting the FY 2007 budget moves forward, Capitol Hill has been abuzz with talk of significantly changing the annual budget process. In the aftermath of the lobbying and ethics scandals of 2005, this year may prove an opportune moment for conservatives to enact damaging budget process changes that would entrench poor policy development mechanisms and alter the balance of power in the federal government. Enhanced Rescission Masquerades as Line-Item Veto The proposal most likely to be tackled by Congress this year is the president's scheme to institute an "enhanced rescission" power in the executive branch. The Line-Item Veto Act of 2006 goes far beyond allowing the president to strike individual wasteful earmarks from appropriations bills, fundamentally shifting power over the revenues of the country from Congress to the president. Under the president's proposal, the executive branch: - could use the enhanced rescission power to make changes to funding or legislative language for any discretionary or mandatory program; - would be able to package cuts to popular services and programs with controversial, high-profile pork spending, forcing difficult votes for Congress who would have to approve or reject the president's package without amendment; and - could delay or cancel funding even if Congress votes to overturn the president's vetoes. The legislation would give the president unprecedented power to manipulate Congress, allowing the White House to threaten or override many tenuous compromises, both for funding levels for, and policy changes to, federal programs. The president would also be able to use the threat of a line-item veto to pressure lawmakers to support administration priorities on specific and unrelated votes, putting members of Congress at the mercy of the whims of the executive branch. Not only are these proposals dangerous, they're completely unnecessary. The president already has the power to delay or cancel funding under the Impoundment and Control Act of 1974 and can use the regular veto power of the president to rebuke an overspending Congress. Despite having these powers, President Bush has yet to veto a single piece of legislation and, even more incredibly, has yet to prepare and request of Congress one, single rescission as president. He is the first president since the law was enacted not to use this power of the office. Biennial Budgeting Also emerging from the depths of budget process reform lore is a proposal for biennial budgeting. The idea that Congress should approve a two-year budget every other year has been thrown around Washington for ages and has been reviewed, studied, debated, and largely rejected many times before. Supporters believe there simply is not enough time in the year for Congress to construct, debate, and approve a budget, adhere to statutory and internal deadlines, and also conduct rigorous oversight of federal programs. They also believe, but do not advertise, that biennial budgeting will likely severely reduce funding in the second year of each budget with routine inflationary adjustments both underestimated and strongly opposed by fiscal conservatives. While recent experience indicates Congress has been horrendously bad at enacting the budget on time each year (in 2002, in a result more common than not, not one appropriations bill was completed on time), there is no reason to believe having a budget every other year would expedite the process. More likely the outcome would be much more intense and divisive debate, making compromise and consensus and ultimately approval of a budget all the more difficult. In addition, biennial budgeting would hamper Congress' flexibility to adapt to changing funding priorities and unexpected shifts in the country's spending needs. This would necessitate a tremendous increase in reliance on "emergency spending" bills that lack sufficient fiscal management mechanisms or accountability standards, making still more difficult Congress' work to manage the nation's finances. Instead of this reckless budget process change, Congress should consider changing its schedule. The 2006 legislative calendar boasts the fewest working days for Congress in over twenty years, just 125 counting Mondays and Fridays when no votes are held. If members of Congress were in Washington and working anywhere near a typical work week, perhaps they would find it possible to complete the budget on time and conduct proper oversight of government resources. Sunset Commissions Another staple Bush administration proposal, sunset commissions, has recently crept its way into the budget process reform debate. Sunset commission proposals have been included annually in the president's budget request; the administration sent a legislative proposal last summer to Congress to institute the commissions; and several other bills in Congress would also implement them. But until this year the proposals had failed to gain even marginal attention. These proposals would force federal programs to plead for their lives every 10 years before a standing body of officials appointed by the president. Such a system seriously threatens federal government programs of all stripes, particularly social safety net programs and public interest projects across the government. Read more about the perils and pitfalls of current sunset commissions proposals from the Regulatory Policy Program at OMB Watch.