The National Research Council (NRC) concluded, in a recent report on biochemical research and bioterrorism safeguards, that an open and free exchange of scientific research and ideas is an important component of efforts to protect the country from a biochemical attack or accident. Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences recommends several measures to reduce the risk of an attack using biological weapons or an accident involving biological agents and technology. Among its recommendations for protecting the country against a biochemical threat the report stresses the need for openness of scientific research, stating, "[i]n general, restrictive regulations and the imposition of constraints on the flow of information are not likely to reduce the risks that advances in the life sciences will be utilized with malevolent intent in the future. In fact, they will make it more difficult for civil society to protect itself against such threats and ultimately are likely to weaken national and human security." This conclusion directly contradicts recent efforts by Congress to restrict the openness of bioterrorism research. Sen. Richard Burr (R-NC) has introduced legislation to create a new, secret federal agency in charge of coordinating efforts to address biological, chemical and other threats to public health. The Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Agency (BARDA) would be the first federal agency to be completely exempt from the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). After Congress baulked at the blanket secrecy for BARDA, Burr began revising the legislation to create some degree of transparency for the new agency. While the new language is not yet finalized, open government advocates involved in negotiations around the legislation report that the revised bill appears still to err on the side of secrecy. Noting that there may be rare cases where restrictions on scientific research are necessary, the NRC report makes a number of arguments in support of maintaining a free and open marketplace of ideas on biochemical research: Improved Quality of Research The report argues that "efforts to restrict the flow of information in the life sciences are likely to impede the ability of the scientific establishment to keep ahead of potential threats." Such restrictions would make forming collaborations between scientists more difficult, especially international collaborations. Additionally, depriving most scientists access to such a vast amount of valuable information would, in turn, slow the advancement of biochemistry research. "Great advances often come from the seemingly random blending of technical approaches and theoretical insights from different fields," according to the report. In the end, the report argues, restriction of information would cause a reduction in the effectiveness of countermeasures against bioterrorism attacks and biochemical accidents. Difficulty of Regulating Life Sciences The NRC report notes that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to effectively regulate and monitor biochemical research. First, the sheer scope of the field would prove difficult to regulate, with the life sciences covering many disciplines and a large number of individuals and institutions performing research in this area. The report also states that "the range and number of scientists and institutions that would be affected by any attempt to impose new information controls would be vast and difficult to list, let alone monitor." Second, much of the research is performed in other countries with collaborations between U.S. scientists and their overseas colleagues. Without an international body to oversee and regulate such research, the U.S. government would be unable to regulate the entire field. Hence, much of the information and research would still be publicly accessible. Third, with a well established culture of openness, the life science research community would be resistant to efforts to restrict information flows and generally has been "historically open, international in scope, and widely distributed." Excessive Financial Costs The economic costs associated with regulating and monitoring biochemical research would be "very high," according to the report. As evidence of the high cost of protecting information, the report notes the cost of safeguarding secrets pertaining to the U.S. nuclear weapons program--$1 trillion over a 50-year period. The costs associated with maintaining the secrecy of biological research, according to the report, would be "enormously more expensive." Emergence of a Biological Research Black Market The report notes that "efforts to impose restrictions on the flow of information are generally unrealistic and may lead to a black market that is much more difficult to monitor and oversee." Adding to the difficulty of such efforts is the fact that "the world already has access to and cannot possibly be denied further access to the knowledge, materials, and equipment" necessary for developing biological agents that could be involved in a bioterrorist attack or biochemical accident. In Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, the NRC makes a persuasive case that efforts to restrict the flow of biochemical research information should not be taken hastily. Not only would such efforts be difficult, if not impossible, but they could weaken research in this important field and, thereby, leave the U.S. more vulnerable. The report demonstrates that openness is often the best defense when it comes to national security.